This paper reports the results of microsimulations using data from the 1986 Current Population Sumey-Child Support Supplement (CPS-CSS). The results show that improving collections, increasing the percentages of custodial families with awards, andlor implementing an assured benefit would increase the amount of money going to black, Hispanic, and white custodial families. Different alternative systems have quite different effects, however, and these systems also have different effects on the distribution of income across racial and ethnic groups.
INTRODUCTION
The quality of American child support systems is vitally important to the nation's future.
Nearly one out of every four children is living apart from at least one parent and therefore is potentially eligible for child support. More significantly, one out of every two children born ,today will become eligible for child support before reaching the age of 18 pumpass, 1984).
Unfortunately, the American child support system has had three major problems throughout its history. First, it has allowed too many noncustodial parents to shirk their financial responsibilities.
In 1987, less than 60 percent of women with an eligible child had a child support award (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990a). Among unmarried mothers, about one in five had a child support award. Of all custodial parents with child support awards, only half received the full amount due from their absent partners, and almost a quarter received nothing. Second, the child support system has been rife with inequity: it has treated equals unequally and has been regressive. Whether the noncustodial parent has been ordered to pay support, how much he has been ordered to pay, and how much effort has been devoted to forcing him to pay has depended not just on his ability to pay but also on the varying attitudes of judges, district attorneys, and welfare officials, as well as the skills of both parents' lawyers.' Child support awards as a percentage of the noncustodial parent's income have declined as income has increased (Garfinkel and Wong, 1987) . Third, the failure of the child support system to ensure that noncustodial parents pay child support has impoverished their children and has shifted the burden of supporting them to the public sector. Nearly half of all children living in female-headed households are poor and on welfare (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990b; Garfinkel and McLanahan, 1986) .'
To redress these shortcomings of the current child support system, researchers at the Institute for Research on Poverty, in conjunction with state child support officials, have designed the Child Support Assurance System (CSAS). The philosophical premise underlying the CSAS is that both 2 parents are responsible for sharing their income with their children and that the government is responsible for assuring that children who live apart from at least one parent receive the financial support to which they are entitled. The three major components of the CSAS are (1) a child support standard, (2) routine income withholding, and (3) an assured child support benefit. The share of income, or child support obligation, is determined by a simple legislated standard. Child support payments are routinely withheld from wages and other sources of income, and the child's custodian receives either what the nonresident parent pays or an assured child support benefit, whichever is higher.
On one hand, the CSAS has become the model the nation has followed in reforming the means by which child support is collected. Between 1983 and 1987 Wisconsin, in a series of gradual steps, adopted those features of the CSAS that pertain to the collection of payments. The Family Support Act of 1988 requires all states to adopt a child support standard and routine income withholding by 1994, and thereby extends the two key collection-side features of the Wisconsin CSAS to the nation as a whole.
On the other hand, there has been very little progress towards enacting an assured child support benefit. Although 1984 federal child support legislation permitted Wisconsin to use federal funds that would otherwise have been devoted to AFDC to help finance an assured benefit, and although state legislation authorized piloting the assured benefit in several counties, the state has repeatedly delayed implementation of the assured benefit. New York received a federal waiver similar to Wisconsin's in 1988 and began piloting a restricted version of an assured benefit in late 1989.
In the absence of an assured child support benefit, the adoption of the collection-side features of the CSAS may have perverse effects on the distribution of income. Low-income single parents are likely to be receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) benefits, which are reduced by one dollar for each dollar of child support received in excess of $50 per month. Thus, increases in child support payments by the nonresident parents of children on welfare will result in little or no financial gain for welfare families. Instead, they will offset AFDC payments. The gains will go to taxpayers in the form of reduced taxes. An assured child support benefit will channel the AFDC 3 savings that result from increased child support collections towards the low-income families that are eligible for child support.
The potential income distribution effects of child support reforms are of particular importance to minority groups, since minority children are more likely to live in single-parent families and to be born out of wedlock, and since minorities are more likely to need and use welfare. In this paper we use a microsimulation model to examine some effects of child support reforms on the incomes of whites, blacks, and Hispanics. In particular, we examine the effects of increasing the number of custodial parents with awards, of increasing the level of child support awards, of increasing the percentage of child support that is collected, and/or of establishing an assured child support benefit.
There are at least two ways to pose the question of how alternative child support systems affect members of racial and ethnic minorities. One way is to examine the impact of alternative systems on the custodial parents and children who would receive the financial benefits of these systems. Presumably, custodial parents and their children would benefit from the substitution of welfare income with nonwelfare income and the increase in income under some alternative systems.
It is likely, however, that the lower income of minority noncustodial parents relative to that of white non-Hispanic noncustodial parents would result in lower child support payments for blacks and Hispanics. This would mean that an assured benefit is probably more critical to minority families than to white non-Hispanic families.
A second way to pose this issue is to examine the income redistribution effects of alternative child support systems across racial and ethnic groups. Because black and Hispanic families are more likely to receive AFDC than are white families, the current system redistributes income from whites to blacks and Hispanics. Altering the system will also alter the nature of this income redistribution.
It is not clear a priori how this income redistribution will occur. An increase in child support payments from black and Hispanic noncustodial parents will reduce reliance on AFDC and thus reduce the flow of income from taxpayers to recipients, and from whites to minority groups. On the other hand, an assured benefit will replace the costs of welfare with new costs that have to be borne by taxpayers.
The next section of the paper briefly describes the evolution of federal child support legislation. The third section describes the data and simulation model. The results are presented in the fourth section and the paper concludes with a brief summary and discussion of policy implications.
THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL CHILD SUPPORT LEGISLATION
Prior to 1975, child support was nearly exclusively a state and local matter. State laws required nonresident parents to pay child support, but left all the details up to local courts (Krause, 1981; Chambers, 1979; Cassetty, 1978) . Judges decided whether any child support should be paid and, if so, how much. They also had full authority over what to do if the nonresident parent failed to pay. Imprisonment was the ultimate punishment for failure to pay. The Family Support Act also has three major paternity provisions: (1) a requirement that states either establish paternity in at least half the cases or increase the proportion of cases in which they establish paternity by three percentage points each year; (2) a requirement that states obtain the social security numbers of both parents in conjunction with the issuance of birth certificates; and (3) a requirement that all parties in a contested paternity case take a genetic test upon the request of any one of the parties involved, and that the federal government fund 90 percent of the costs of blood tests.
DATA AND METHODS
The microsimulation requires a data source that provides information on all those who will be eligible for the CSAS. The 1986 Current Population Survey-Child Support Supplement (CPS-CSS) is a national data set that, while not perfect, provides the most complete information available on the largest sample of those eligible for the CSAS.4 It includes demographic information on the custodial parent (age, race, education, etc.), on the children (number, age of the youngest, etc.), and on income and labor force participation. It also provides information on the existence and amount of a child support award, as well as on the amount paid. In our simulation, all women who are eligible for child support (including remarried women) are included, for a total of 3631 cases, including 830 non-Hispanic blacks, 301 Hispanics, and 2500 non-Hispanic whites and members of other races.5
Model
The simulation can be conceptually divided into four parts: (1) modeling the current (1985) situation; (2) modeling the changes in the child support system; (3) determining the individual responses to these changes; and (4) aggregating these individual changes to determine summary indices related to changes in poverty, in AFDC use, and in program costs. The simulation model has been described in more detail in Meyer et al. (1991) .
Modelinp the Current Situation
The "current" situation in the simulation is the child support system in place in 1985. For each family, we need a value for the amount of child support currently awarded and received, the amount of AFDC received, and total family income.
There are several complications in this "simple" task. Determining the amount of child support received presents a complication because AFDC recipients do not receive the full amount of 7 child support paid, only the first $50/month. They thus may not know the full amount paid. We have therefore estimated child support amounts following the technique used in Meyer et al. (1991) .
Determining the amount of AFDC received is problematic for two reasons: (I) it is underreported; and (2) receiving AFDC provides benefits beyond the cash amount (primarily Medicaid) that are not easily valued. To correct for the problem of underreporting, families that did not report AFDC participation, but whose income and family status made them appear eligible, were assigned AFDC according to procedures outlined in Meyer et al. (1991) .6 No adjustment was made for the value of Medicaid because valuing Medicaid is problematic.' Total family income was then calculated as the combination of child support, AFDC, earnings, and all other income. We then determined the number of people in poverty and the aggregate poverty gap (the amount of income needed to bring all families up to the poverty line).
Modeling the Changes in the Child S u~~o r t Svstem
A key component of the Child Support Assurance System is an assured child support benefit, a guaranteed amount of child support paid ftom public funds if necessary. We test an assured benefit available to all women with child support awards, regardless of income level, with the public portion of the assured benefit (that is, the difference between the assured benefit and the amount that the noncustodial parent pays) subject to federal income tax. We examine three levels of an assured benefit, with the first child entitling a custodial parent with a child support award to a minimum of $1000, $2000, or $3000 annually. In each plan the benefit increases by $1000 for the second child, $1000 for the third, and $500 each for the fourth and fifth child. We assume that the AFDC program will treat the assured benefit as unearned income, reducing AFDC benefits by one dollar for every dollar of assured benefits. The effect of thisassumption is that women will choose between the assured benefit and AFDC, but will not receive both, since there would be no financial advantage to receiving both.
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The CSAS is predicted to have several effects:
1. Increases in the number of cases with awards are likely because of the requirement that cases must have awards to receive the assured benefit, and because of already enacted legislation making it easier to establish paternity and making the having of an award more worthwhile.
2.
Increases in the amounts of awards will occur because of requirements that awards be set based on numerical guidelines and because of new requirements for updating awards.
3.
Finally, the percentage collected may also increase due to a variety of improvements in collection mechanisms, including immediate withholding.
Five different scenarios are considered:
1. the current child support system in 1985;
2. a child support system in which child support awards are set according to the Wisconsin standard and the number of women with child support awards and the amount collected are increased such that half of the gap between the 1985 system and the perfect system is closed;
a perfect child support system (all families have awards, all awards are set according to the standard, and all that is due is collected); 4. a scenario in which all cases have child support awards but award levels and the percentage collected remain at their 1985 levels; and 5, a scenario in which all that is due is collected, but there are no changes in the number with awards or award levels.
These scenarios require that we estimate the amount of child support award each woman could receive, which in turn requires that we estimate the income of the noncustodial parent.
Unfortunately, the income of the noncustodial parent is not available in the CPS-CSS, so estimating procedures developed by Oellerich (1984) are used. These procedures estimate the mean annual To analyze the effects of policy changes, we need a model that predicts responses to changes in the child support system. To determine AFDC participation and labor supply, we use an adjusted behavioral response model outlined in Garfinkel, Robins, Wong, and Meyer (1990) and Meyer et al. (1991) . We assume women select the number of hours they work and whether they will receive either AFDC, the assured benefit, or neither, based on the alternative that provides them with the highest utility (a combination of disposable income and leisure). We calculate current utility for each woman, implement the changes in the child support system, and assume that a woman changes her labor supply and AFDC status only if utility is higher at a different number of hours of work or a different program participation status.
The model makes some of the following predictions. Some women currently receiving a small amount of AFDC will leave AFDC and begin receiving the assured benefit because the assured benefit by itself would be higher than the AFDC amount. Other AFDC recipients will leave AFDC ' because the combination of the assured benefit and new earnings will make life off welfare more attractive. Finally, some women not receiving AFDC and receiving only small amounts of child support will receive the assured benefit, and some of these may decrease the number of hours they work because of the new unearned income.
& g r e g a t i n~ Individual Res~onses
Once the optimal number of hours and program participation levels have been selected for each family, a new amount of annual income and federal taxes can be deter~nined.~ These individual responses are then aggregated to determine four outcomes: the percentage of AFDC recipients who leave AFDC; the reduction in the poverty gap; the average amount of increase in income for custodial families; and the gains and losses of each ethnic group.
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Although the simulation will provide some interesting predictions about the results of the CSAS, a word of caution is in order. The simulation model requires a number of simplifying assumptions, causing us to have more confidence in relative magnitudes than in the point estimates.''
In summary, the microsimulation model predicts how individual families would respond to a change in the current child support system. Families are assumed to decide the number of hours they will work, whether they will receive AFDC, and whether they will collect the assured benefit based on the option that provides the highest utility. Individual responses are aggregated to provide estimates of changes in the income and program participation of the population. Table 1 contains some descriptive information on the Hispanic, black non-Hispanic, and white non-Hispanic members of the samples used in our microsimulations, the members who are all potentially eligible to receive child support.
RESULTS
The marital status of custodial heads is very important in that fewer never-married women have child support awards, partly because it is more difficult to identify the noncustodial parents of the children of such women. Black non-Hispanic families are most likely and white non-Hispanic families are least likely to be headed by never-married women. Unfortunately, sample sizes prevent us from examining Puerto Ricans, those of Mexican origin, and members of other Hispanic populations separately. If we were able to do so, the results would probably show that the percentage of Puerto Ricans who were never married would be closer to the figure for blacks than to the overall figure for Hispanics. These racial differences in marital status are reflected in the percentages of families with child support awards (28 percent for blacks, 37 percent for Hispanics, and 64 percent for whites) and in the percentages of potential child support awards that are collected (16 percent for blacks, 17 percent for Hispanics, and 27 percent for whites).
The other descriptive information is consistent with expectations based on what we know about these three racial and ethnic groups in American society:' members of minority groups are NOTES: "Black" refers to non-Hispanic blacks; "white" refers to non-Hispanic whites and other races. In the average family income section, child support includes the amount paid by the noncustodial parents of children receiving AFDC. In both the family income and the AFDC participation sections, AFDC includes only the public portion of the benefit (that is, net of private child support).
more likely to need and participate in AFDC and are more likely to have lower incomes than nonHispanic whites. Table 2 contains results that allow us to compare the effects of alternative child support systems on custodial families in the different racial and ethnic groups. The systems vary in terms of the improvement in awards and collections and in the level of the assured benefit per child. The closer to perfect we get in awards and collections, and the larger the assured benefit, the greater the impact on custodial families.
The Im~act of Alternative Svstems on Custodial Families
Instituting an assured benefit without changing any other part of the child support system (panel A) would have only modest effects on the poverty gap of custodial families; even the largest assured benefit would decrease the gap by only 6 percent for blacks, 5 percent for Hispanics, and 15 percent for whites. The effects on AFDC participation would be larger, but still fairly modest. One of the reasons the effects are so modest for black and Hispanic custodial families is that most of them do not have child support awards and are thus not eligible for the assured benefit.
Improving the child support system by increasing the number of families with awards, the level of awards, and the percentage collected (panel B, row 1) also has modest effects, decreasing the poverty gap by 8 percent for blacks, 10 percent for Hispanics, and 18 percent for whites. The decreases for whites are larger because we estimate that white noncustodial parents have higher incomes and thus could provide more child support than minority noncustodial parents.
When improvements in the child support system are combined with an assured benefit of $2000, however, the improvement for black and Hispanic custodial families is substantial: the poverty gap is reduced by 15 percent, 13 percent, and 21 percent for blacks, Hispanics, and whites, respectively, and AFDC participation is reduced by 19 percent, 12 percent, and 24 percent.
A perfect system (panel C) of course does even more for all groups, although again the reduction in the poverty gap and AFDC participation for minorities is substantially less than that for whites, if there is no assured benefit. NOTES: "Black" refers to non-Hispanic blacks; "white" refers to non-Hispanic whites and other races.
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The results in panels D and E show that extending child support awards to all custodial families would in general have a larger impact than collecting all that is due. Even without an assured benefit (row I), ensuring that all cases receive an award decreases the poverty gap by more than 10 percent for all groups, while ensuring that collections are perfect would reduce the poverty gap by 2 percent, 2 percent, and 7 percent for blacks, Hispanics, and whites, respectively. Having an award becomes even more important if there is an assured benefit (rows 2 through 4 of panel D):
even without any improvements in award levels or collections, an assured benefit of $3000 combined with every family having an award decreases the poverty gap by about one-third.
The different impacts across groups are due to a number of factors, but occur primarily because the higher income of white noncustodial parents makes the amount of potential private child support available to white custodial parents higher than that available to minority custodial parents. A second factor is that since white custodial family incomes are already higher than minority family incomes, adding the same amount of child support would be more likely to move white families above the poverty line.
The importance of an assured benefit for minority custodial families is clearly illustrated here.
Medium improvements in awards and collections with no assured benefit (panel B, row 1) would reduce AFDC participation by only 3 percent for blacks and 5 percent for Hispanics, compared to 16 percent for non-Hispanic whites. An assured benefit of $2000 does much more, decreasing AFDC participation by 19 percent for blacks, 12 percent for Hispanics, and 24 percent for whites.
One surprising effect is that most alternatives in Table 2 have smaller effects for Hispanics than for blacks. The smaller impact for Hispanics may occur because, as Table 1 showed, the current average AFDC benefit received by Hispanic families ($4588) is higher than that received by black families ($3384) or white families ($3483). Consequently, a shift to a new system would be expected to have a smaller impact on the AFDC participation of Hispanics than it would on the participation of blacks or whites.
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The Effects of Alternative Svstems on Income Redistribution Table 3 contains results that allow us to assess the redistribution of income across racial and ethnic groups created by alternative systems relative to the system in place in 1985. The first set of columns is there to remind us that each program results in a gain to custodial families within each group. The average gain to custodial families includes any new child support they receive, the amount of the assured benefit (net of income taxes), any tax revenue changes that result from changes in earnings, any decreases in the amount of AFDC received, and a portion of the aggregate cost or savings (ignoring administrative costs and savings) that is assumed to accrue through the tax system.
Because additional earnings are "offset" by decreases in leisure, they are not included. The total gain to each ethnic group (the last three columns) includes all of the same categories except for the changes in private child support, which are assumed to be transfers within the ethnic group."
The first set of columns generally reflects what we observed in Table 2 . Changes in the collection side of the child support system benefit whites more than minority groups, with the medium improvement providing the average white family with $1627, the average black family with $635, and the average Hispanic family with $929. Instituting an assured benefit in the medium improvement scenario provides relatively more support to black families, with the $2000 benefit providing an additional $196 on average for black families, $31 for Hispanics, and $32 for whites.
The second set of columns shows the redistributive effects of alternative systems. In general, improvements in awards and collections will result in income being redistributed from the noncustodial parents of AFDC recipients to taxpayers, which will benefit whites more so than blacks from the changes in the current child support system primarily because they receive tax savings that accrue from decreased AFDC costs.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have examined the impact of alternative systems of child support awards, collections, and assured benefits on members of three racial and ethnic groups from two perspectives: that of the custodial families in each group and that of the group as a whole. The results show that improving collections and awards with no assured benefit, as the nation is now in the process of doing, assists the custodial parents in each group, but also produces savings for taxpayers, which transfers income from minority groups to whites. On the other hand, instituting an assured benefit with no improvement in collections and awards would still improve the lives of custodial families in each group and would also lead to a larger transfer of income from taxpayers to recipients and from whites to the minority groups than we see in the current system. Adding an assured benefit of $2000 to a medium improvement in awards and collections helps custodial families in each group and substantially reduces the redistribution from the minority to the white community. Indeed, the black community now gains from the CSAS as a whole. But even a $2000 assured benefit leaves Hispanics net losers. The different effects for blacks and Hispanics occur largely because of differences in the geographical distribution of the two groups.
\
Two caveats must be kept in mind in interpreting these results. First, we are not able in our work to examine the differences across Hispanic subgroups. It is likely that persons of Mexican origin, who are overrepresented in Southwestern states with low AFDC benefits (e.g., Texas, New
Mexico, and Arizona), would be affected differently than Puerto Ricans, who are overrepresented in New York and other parts of the Northeast. Our small sample sizes prevent us from dealing with the heterogeneity of the Hispanic population. Second, the effects of these alternative programs will vary across states for blacks and whites as well as for Hispanics. This is because we would be replacing AFDC benefits, whose levels are set by the states, with a uniform national assured benefit, and because the ability of noncustodial parents to pay child support also varies across states as well as across racial and ethnic groups.
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ENDNOTES
' For general descriptions of the child support system, see Harry 0. Krause (1981) and David L. Chambers (1979) . For more evidence on the inequity in award determination, see K. White Stone (1976) and L. Yee (1979) .
Note that because of low earnings capacity and high child care costs, most women on AFDC could not earn enough to lift their family out of poverty even if they worked full-time (Sawhill, 1976; Michalopoulos and Garfinkel, 1989) .
In effect, Wisconsin was to be given a block grant to run both a child support assurance system and the AFDC system at the same cost to the federal government as the old AFDC system alone.
Extra costs (or savings) were to be borne by (or to be of benefit to) the state.
For a more complete description of the CPS-CSS, see Robins (1987) . The CPS-CSS has four major problems. First, not all those eligible for child support (and thus not all those eligible for the CSAS) are included. For example, custodial fathers and custodial parents younger than 18 are not included. m e omission of younger custodial parents has been corrected in the 1988 CPS-CSS.)
Women who have only been married once and are currently married, but who were single parents prior to the marriage, are also not included. Second, no information is gathered on the noncustodial parent. Third, self-reports of welfare recipiency are used, and AFDC recipiency is seriously underreported, making the identification of recipients and the estimation of welfare savings difficult.
Finally, only annual data are reported, creating problems in identifying those eligible for the CSAS for part of the year and those who are part-year AFDC recipients.
Because the CPS-CSS may have incorrectly identified grandmothers as child-support eligible (see Robins, 1987) , only women younger than 60 were used in the simulation.
The Bureau of the Census reports that the total amount of AFDC reported in the CPS is only 76 percent of the total paid, according to administrative records (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1990b).
Our approach assigns the additional 24 percent to a sample of income-eligible, nonreporting cases.
' Recent work by Moffitt and Wolfe (1990) TO increase the number of cases with .awards, we first divide every case into a portion that has an award and a portion that does not, based on the probability of having an award, and then increase the percentage accordingly (see Meyer et al., 1991) . To increase the percentage collected, we follow a similar methodology. An alternative methodology would identify cases at random to gain new child support awards; we believe this methodology would be inferior, however, because of the limited number of Hispanic women in our sample.
Our federal income tax module assumes that all families take the standard deduction, both before and after the child support changes. An additional simplification is that state income taxes are ignored.
'O We ignore income from food stamps, Medicaid, and the Earned Income Tax Credit, as well as the effects of the CSAS on noncustodial parents and state income taxes. Ignoring these may have affected the results of our model the most. Also, we have not accounted for the absence of some child support-eligible individuals in the CPS-CSS; in particular the absence of custodial fathers affects the average increase in incomes of custodial families due to the CSAS. 
